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The idea of an optimal export tax on a commod-  because the tax to be imposed depends on the
ity is based on the assumption that by imposing a  government's expectations of world prices.
tax, a country can improve its welfare (the sum  Whether the tax is optimal or not depends on
of producer surplus and goverment  revenues)  whether the government's  expectations are met
when it faces a downward-sloping demand curve  by reality.  To impose a realistic tax, the govem-
for the commodity.  The idea is thought to be  ment needs to know the farmers' expectations
particularly relevant to producers with large  and the prospects for world prices of a particular
world market shares for primary commodities for  perennial.
which the price-elasticity of demand is low.  An
export tax is considered necessary because tho  Akiyama's numerical example shows that
scattered farmers' expected marginal revenue is  national welfare is not very sensitive to the tax
higher than the marginal revenue of the country  rate.  But the tax does significantly affect the
as a whole.  distribution of benefits between farmers and
govemment - and significantly affects long-
Akiyama uses a model to calculate the  term production.  The numerical example also
optimal tax and to evaluate the effect of the tax  shows quantitatively how much interest rates,
and other factors on welfare.  Simulation results  exchange rates, and marketing and production
show that the optimal level of the export tax  costs affect welfare and, in the long run, the
depends on how farmers and government form  perennial subsector.
their expectations of future prices.  He found that
the tax is indeterminate when the government  Akiyama concludes that in imposing an
does not know how farmers form their expecta-  export tax on percnnials, a government should
tions and when farmers' expectations are inde-  give Icss consideration to the tax's optimality
pendent of recent prices or taxes. The govem-  and more to how the tax affects welfare distribu-
ment can only impose an "estimated" optimal tax  tion and long-tcrm production.
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The idea  of an  optimal export tax is  based on the assumption  that the
tax-imposing country can thereby increase its total wcifare (i.e.  the sum of
producer surplus  and  government  revenue),  when it faces  a  downward-sloping  demand
curve for  the commodity.  This  proposition is  thought  to be  particularly relevant
to producers with large world market shares of primary commodities with highly
price-inelastic demand.  An export  tax is considered  to be necessary because the
atomistic farmers,  expected marginal revenue is  higher than the  marginal revenue
of the country as a whole.  Hence, the tax is imposed to change the farmers'
marginal revenue to that of the whole country.
Trivedi  and Akiyama (forthcoming) has a literature review on this
issue.  An analytical solution for  the optimal export tax fo,r  crops with a short
gestation period  (annuals) is well-known  (see e.g., Chapter 7 of W.M. Corden,
1974).  But because of the lifficulty caused by the complVx dynamics in supply
of  perennial  crops,  an  analytical solution  has  not been developed  to  this
problem.  To evaluate the effects of the tax on welfare, it is indisp3nsable to
take the long-term supply response into account as noted by Deaton and Benjamin
(1987).  The approach taken by Imran and Duncan (1988) to calculating optimal
taxes on four perennial crops under short- and long-run supply elasticities,
which is an  extension of Repetto (1972),  is clear but does not take the dynamics
of supply into account.  Trivedi and Akiyama do take the dynamics of supply
into account  and calculate the impacts  of  the export tax on  welfare but avoid  the
question of optimality.
This paper is in a sense a sequel to Trivedi and Akiyama and shows
that, with some reasonable assumptions, the optimal tax for perennials can be
solved analytically.  The analysis shows that the optimal tax solution obtained
by Imran and Duncan is a special case.  The paper goes beyond Imran and Duncan
to show, in some detail, the relationships among key  variables such as the
exchange  rate,  production  costs,  farmer expectations,  and  taxes,  and  also
provides  solutions  for  calculating  the  magnitude  of  welfare  changes  under-2-
different tax rates.
Two approaches to determining the optimal tax are given here.  The
first is under the assumption of a zero shozt-term supply price elasticity and
finds the  optimc.l  tax  through equating marginal  cost and  expected marginal
revenue of new plancings, which is the investment variable.  This approach is
straightforward  but cannot  handle the  effects of  the tax  on welfare in  the short-
run arising from non-zero short-term price elasticity of supply.  The second
approach expresses the national welfare directly in terms of the tax and finds
the maximum welfare tax level.  The second approach can handle the assumption of
non-zero short-run supply response.
The two approaches are shown graphically below.
Tax in  period 0  >  New Plantings in  period 0 (NPO)  > Change in  Welfare
in periods when
NPo  is yielding i~~~~~~i
Change in Welfare  Cost of New Plantings
in period 0  in Period 0
In  the figure  above,  the first  approach starts  from  the second  column
(New  Plantings) while the second starts from  the first  column (Tax  in period 0).
The second approach takes into account all the effects of the first approach by
linking the tax rate to the new plantings and hence is more general.
The  remainder of the paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  I
provides an analysis of farmers' expected marginal revenue from new plantings
without a consideration of taxes, and Section II provides the framework for-3-
calculating  country's  or government's  marginal revenues. Section III  derives the
optimal export tax for several cases.  Section IV presents the more general
approach to solving for the optimal tax analytically.  An application of the
analysis to the case of cocoa  in Ghana  is given in Section V.  Section VI
concludes.
I.  Farmers' Expected Marginal Revenue from New Plantings
When There Are No Export Taxes
Assume  the short-term  price  elasticity  of supply  to  be zero  and hence
adjustments in supply can only be made through new plantings (NP).'  Assuming
yield (Y;)  to be stable, farmers' expected incremental net revenue in period i
(i  >  0) from new plantings of NPo  in  period 0 when there is no export tax can be
expressed as
(1)  Efo  (ANRf)  =  (Et, 0 (WPi)  -Et,  0 (P1,.))  *NPo *
where
Ef,o(ANRf)  Farmers'  expected  net  incremental  revenue  in
period i due to new planting in period 0
ESo  (WP,)  =  Farmers' expected world  price  for  period  i  in
period 0
Efo,(Pi,.)  Farmers'  expected  cost  of  maintaining,  and
harvesting a unit area of the commodity plantings
made in period i.
New plantings here include re-plantings.A.?~ ~~~~~~~0
4, ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  -4
Production  in Period  i
Figure  1. Effects  of  New  PLantings  on  SuppLy  and  WorLd  PriceY,  Yield  in period  i.
Figure 1  illustrates  this graphically  where  Q 1 and Qi  are production
in period i without and with NPo  and D,  is the export demand curve facing the
country.
NPo  produces Qi  ° - Q,  in period i, i.e.,
(2)  ° - Q  0  = NPo . Y,
Under the assumption of zero short term price elasticity of supply, the country
produces Qi  when there is no new planting or 01  when there is NP 0 of new
plantings in period 0, as long as the world price is above Pi,,  in period i.
Assuming that the trees planted produce the commodity between the
period ml and m2, (ml  >  0,  m2 > ml), the farmers'  expected sum of the discounted
future flow of  net revenues from the investment of NPo  in period 0 is
(3)  Efo(.NRf)  =  2 f  -(WP 1)  -Ef, 0 (P..))  *NPo . Y
where
Ef,o(NR)  =  Farmers'  expected  discounted  future  flow  of  net  revenues  from  NPo
which is the discount factor of farmers, and-6-
rf  - the interest rate  farmers face
Farmer's  expected  maarginal  revenue  from  new  plantings  can  be  obtained  by
d.fierentiating E(,O(NRt)  by NPo  and hence,
(4)  E  (MR)  =  aEf°  (1f)  =  YI (E1,0(WP 1)  -Ef o(P1,c))
Equation (4) indicates that the farmers' expected marginal revenue
depends on their expectation of the world price and their production costs.
Because farmers usually have a good idea of the latter in real terms, it can be
assumed to be a constant, PC. 2
Denoting  Efo(WPi)  and EfO(WPiNP)  to be  the  farmers' expected world
prices with and without NP 0, respectively, and defining the expected change in
the world price as (see Figure 1),
(5)  A  WPI  = Ef!  (WP 1 )  - Ef, 0 (WPiI  )
the farmers' expected marginal revenue can be given using %4)
(6)  l  c  os(t)  a  in r  el  t  (Erms  (WPI) -.  WPJ - PC)
2  All  prices  and costs  are  in real  terms.-7-
Given the marginal new plantings cost curve for period 0, MC(NPO),  the level of
new plantings will be solved by equating MC(NPO)  and (4)  or
m2
(7)  MC(NP0 )  _  t  (E1,0 (WP)  -PC)
ml
The solution NP  f,o  is shown in Figure 2 which asisu'es  a linear MC schedule.  It
is  clear from (7)  that  the interest  rate  has an important impact  on new plantings
&nd hence on long-term supply of perennials as noted in Trivedi (1988).
II.  Expected Marginal Revenue for Country
From the country or government's viewpoint, equation (4)  is not the
marginal revenue with respect to NPo  mainly because the individual farmer does
not realize  that NPo causes a producer  surplus loss of AWPj.Q 1 (or the  area
WP,ABWPI,NP  in Figure 1).
Denoting  E 8,O(WPi)  and  E5,O(WP,NP)  as  the  government's  expectation  of
world  prices with  and without the effect of NPO, respectively, the expected
incremental net revenue for the country in period i, Eg*O(ANRg)  is
(8)  Eg,  0 (ANRg)  - (Eg,o( (WP)  -AWP 1 -PC)  . NPo . Y 1-AWP 1 . Q 1Ff,ct  -~~~~~~~~  .1  .,-
/l~~M
/  I




- - {  z -l  -~~~~I 
I  Ist  Ses
blew  Plantings  in Period O (NP  )~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Figure 2*  ew  Plantins  ScheiuIwhere  AWPi - ES,O(WPI) - E5,o(WPINP)
Hence  the expected mar'inal revenue for the country is
(9)  ~~~Eg,  O  (MR)  =' E  c  (ET  0  (WP,)  -,&  WP,  _PC;)  . Y, -A\P  .p  Q] 
where
(  )  =  discount  factor  for  the  government
r-  interest rate for the government.
AWP can be approximated by 3
(10)  AwP1 =  PO .Y 1 -Eg,0 (WP1 ) . lo )  a,~~~~~~~  (e  6i,  + (I1 _ SH, )  eR°j)
wnere
QIW  =  World production
6djW  World price elasticity of demand
C,,,Raw  Price elasticity of supply in tne rest-of-world.
SHi  =  Share of the country or Q 1/Q 1 w
3  Derived from  the elasticity of demand the country faces as given in Annex
1 of Imran and Duncan (1988).  This implicitly assumes that production of other
countries  responds  to  world  prices  but  not  policies  taken  by  the  country
concerned.  FJ.om  the  author's  experiences  of  analyzing  supply  of  various
perennial crops in  a  number  of countries  and  discussing  with government  officials
and  farmers  in  perennial  crop  exporting  countries,  this  assumption  seems
appropriate.- 10  -
Substituting (10) into (9),  we obtain
(11)  Eg,o (MR)  =  Y  (Eg,o (WPi) -PC)  -NPoO  Yi9  Elg,o (WPi)
S  8XQ  Y1 * Eg 0 (WPJ)
where  ei  =  edl'  +  ,1  - SH;)  .Ro
The  first  term  of  RHS  of  (11)  is  the  same  as  Ef,o(MR)  given  by  (6),
the  farmers,  expected  marginal  revenue,  if  we  assume  Bf  =  P,,AWP  in (6)  to  be
zero, and ErO(WPI)  =  E1,O(WPI).  The  second  and  third  terms  represent  the  extent  to
which  E5 ,O(MR)  is  smaller  than E(O(MR)  because  of  the downward-sloping demand curve
facing the country.  Because NPO.Y,  is usually much smaller than Qi,  omission of
the second term of the RHS of (11)  would not much affect E,O(MR). For the same
reason AWP;  in (6)  can be omitted.
Hence  assuming  of  =  ,  (11)  can be  simplified to
(12)  Eg  o(MR)  =Et. 0 (M)  -_f3gQ1 YQ1Ego(W.Pe)
The optimal new plantings at time 0  (NP 0), given  (12), can be determined by
solving- 12  -
(15)  E  p
1 Y1 . (Ef 0 (WPI)  -TX 1) =.  E  Yj(Eg*o(WPi)  -SHY,Eg,o(WPi)/e)
From (15),  an obvious solution for the optimal tax for i=ml,....m2 evaluated in
period 0 is
(16)  TXi = Ef,0(WP 1 )  -Egq,(WPi  (1_- H)
el
Below  the  optimal  tax  is derived  under  different  assumptions  about  price
expectation formations.  But first we examine cases in which the optimal tax
cannot be determined.
(i)  Cases in which the Optimal Tax Cannot be Determined
It is clear from  (16) that the optimal tax cannot be determi'Led
unless farmers' and the government's expectations are specified.  A likely case
is  the government's  expectation is  specified  but the  government does not  know how
farmers' expectations on prices and tax are formed.  In this case, the optimal
tax is indeterminate.  Such situation can arise, if in the past, real producer
prices have been fluctuating  widely due to, for example, erratic exchange rates
or tax  policies and/or  the inflation  rate have  been fluctuating  widely.  In  these
cases, farmers  may have little idea what real producer prices to expect.  Then
optimal tax  is  indeterminate because whatever tax the government  imposes in
period 0, farmers are not likely to believe that it will persist.  Therefore,
taxes have no effect on farmers'  expected revenues from new plantings and hence
taxes have no effect on new plantings.
Even when farmers' and the governments' expectations are specified,
the optimal tax is indeterminate if farmers' expectations are independent of- 11 -
(13)  MC(NPO)  = Ef,  0(MR)  -...  j3'  Yi.  Eg,oWPi)
Because Q;  is the level of production when NPo  =  0, it  is not a function of NPo.
Thus, in Figure 2  E,O(MR)  is a straight line below EfO(MR)  with the difference
being the second term of the RHS of (13).  The optimal new plantings for the
country is shown as NPgO'  in Figure 2.
III.  Optimal Export Tax
The purpose of a tax on the export of perennials is to put a wedge
between  world prices and  producer  prices so  as  to  maximize the country's  welfare.
The optimal tax is that which makes the farmers, expected marginal revenue the
same as  the country's. 4 To this end the farmers'  expectations have to be changed
from EfO(MR)  to E^,O(MR)-
From (4) and (12),  we obtain
E  P'  Y 1 (Et,0 (WP 1 )  - TXi  -PC)  =  S  (Eg  i,o(WPI)  -PC)  . Ql  Eg, 0 (WPI)
The general formula for the optimal tax is (14).  Assuming  p  =
(this is assumed for the rest of the paper unless specified otherwise and  3
replaces of  and I.)  and denoting SH;  =  Q
1/Qiw  we obtain
4  Of course, the optimal tax is zero if farmers' expected marginal revenue
is the same as the country's.- 13-
recent prices or taxes.  The problem occurs because in such a case there is no
link  between the tax to be imposed for the periods between ml end m2 and the tax
at period 0 in vi,  x  of the fact that (16)  specifies the optimal tax for periods
ml-m2.  Because farmers' price expectations change with time, the optimal tax
rates for  periods 0 are continuously indeterminate.  In  other wo.ds, the optimal
tax is relevant only to the extent that it can change farmers expected marginal
revenue flows of the future period ml to m2.
A particular case of interest is when price expectations held by
farmers and the government are the same and are independent  of recent prices or
taxes.  Then  the  optimal  tax  formula  can  be  obtained  by  inserting
Ef,o  (wPP)  = Eg,o  (WPi)  into  (16) which  gives
(17)  TX,'  =  SH  . Eg 0 (WP 1 ) /ef
The optimal tax rate given in (17) looks similar to that given by
Imran  and Duncan  except for  the subscript i.  But  as discussed above, (17)  cannot
determine the optimal tax rate for period 0.
(ii)  Farmers Exipect  the Current Tax or Tax Rate to Continue
The optimal tax rate can be determined if  we can assume that farmers
expect the current tax or current tax rate to continue.
In this case (15)  becomes
(18)  £2pIYI  Eto  (WPf)  (1-TXRO)  =  pi  YiEg,o  (WPj)  (1-SH 1/ej)
Then  the  optimal  tax  rate  at  period  0  is- 14 -
(19)  TXR.2  =  1P'YiE,o  (WPi)  SHi/e 1
(T  E1f,Q  (WPi)
and the producer price
(20)  PPO2  =WP  1.  - £  YiEl,o  (WPi)  SHi/ei
E 0 I Y 1Ef, 0 (WP 1 )  )
(19) implies that  once the  farmers' and  the government's  price
expectations are specified, the optimal tax rate can be determined.  Note that
in this case the optimal tax rate is not a function of the current world price
and the producer price, hence it would not change with changes in the current
world price.
(iii)  Farmers Expect the Current Producer Price to continue
(Farmers'  Naive Case)
In this case, from (15)  TXo  should be the level that satisfies
(21)  (  WP- TX -PC)  L1Y=  YrEIO(WP)  - SH  . Eg,  0 (WP 1)  _PC
The optimal tax is then,
(22)
1YyEg,o  (WP 1)  -SH
(22)  T 
3 =W1%O  LI- 15  -
and the optimal tax rate
(23)  *3 1  Y__,  (wp_) (1  __"I)_ 
TXR0*  =  1  - | E  E
The producer price in this case is, from (23),
(24)  PP3  = WPo  (-TXR 3)  =  (WPf) (1 -- e)
The producer price  given by (24) implies  that the optimal tax should
be such that the producer price not change  with WPO. This is an extreme case of
a progressive tax and suggests that producer nrices should be at the same level
over long periods of time as other variables in (24) do not change.
(iv) Farmers' Price ExDectations are Based on a Weiahted Averaae of
Current and Past Prices
A more general case of the "farmers' naive case" is when farmers,
expected prices are based on a weighted average of the current and the past
producer prices or
(n
(25)  Et,  O  (Wi)  = £0 Ai (WPJ  - TX>)- 16  -
where
-n
SE  J=  1
The optimal tax rate in this case is
(26)  TXR* 4 =1+  x  - Aj  (  TXj)  YE  _E_s,  (WPj)  (I  -
TXRon  *  WP  lo  -.  WP0.o  E  w  X  Y 1
Substituting PPj  =  WPj  - TXJ,  the producer price in this case is
(27)  PPO'  =  WP 0 (I-TXRSIY)  =  E  Y E  (WPJ)  (1-ei
PPj  after n periods becomes PPO  if the expected value of
Ep13YiEg,O(WPi)  (1-SH 1/e1)  for the period i.=ml+n,...,m2+n  does not change from
that for the period i=l,...m.  This is a reasonable assumption if n is short
compared with ml and m2.
Then (27)  becomes- 17  -
(28)  p  =  E  1'Yi  Eg,o  (WP1)  (1-  H)
and the optimal tax rate is
Y  (3  YEg,  (WA' 1)  (1-SH
(29)  T  R*1=1-  e__  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _  _
(29)  ~~~~~~~~WPOE  Pi Y
(28)  and (29)  imply  that after  n periods, the producer price becomes independent
of the current world price as in the naive expectation case.  Note also that the
optimal tax rate and  producer price become the same  as the naive case of (23)  and
(24)  respectively, after n periods.
(v)  Price expectations of Farmers and Government are Based on a  Weichted
Average of Current and Past Prices
Assume that farmers' expected  producer prices are as in (25)  and the
government's are
(30)  Eg.o (WPj)  =  WPj
where- 18  -
The optimal tax rate, in this case, is
(31)  TXRo 5 =  - - ) 1SH 1/ei
E pi  y  SHIrAGW
+ w 2 1 0 A  {  ppi-  E2WPi+  eI  Y  )
and the producer price
(32)  Pp  4  =  Iio|1-  |WPO+
0o  )p  Y,  Ao
E2p  yi  SHqjrX,W
+  e-l  i?i  Ex  -P.7.
Note that in (31), (32)  and (33),  summation of j is from -1 to -n for Xj  and from
-1 to -g for X 3 J.
If we assume SH;  =  0 and rearrange (32)  we obtain- 19  -
(33)  AOPPo5  +E1APPj  =  AoWP 0 42AJWPJ
It  can be seen from (33)  that a role of the optimal tax is  to change
the producer price so that farmers'  expected prices become the same as those of
the government.  Hence even when a country's market share is small, tax and
subsidies can be imposed to change farmers' expectation to the government's.  It
should be noted that in equations  (33) the optimal tax could be positive or
negative (subsidy).
(vi)  Effects of the Government's Price Expectations on the Optimal Tax
An important caveat to the above derivations of the optimal tax is
that they are only optimal provided that the government's expectations about
world prices  (E 5,O(WP;))  subsequently turn out to be realized.  Because future
world prices are not known when an export tax is imposed, the optimal taxes as
derived  above  are  essentially  "estimated"  optimal  taxes.  The  closer  the
government's expected  world prices  are  to  subsequently  realized  world prices,  the
closer the optimal tax is to the true optimal level.- 20 -
IV.  An Alternative Anyroach to Solvina for the Optimal Exoort Tax
The approach taken above derived the optimal tax from equating the
marginbl  revenue and marginal  cost of new plantings.  A more  comprehensive
approach  would be to express national  welfare in  terms of the tax and search for
the maximizing point.  This approach allows us to take into account the effects
of the tax on short-term supply  response.  The case  considered here is  that where
farmers' price expectations are naive.  Other cases can be derived similarly.
(i)  Effects of ExRort Tax on Welfare in Period 0
In  period 0, the tax affects new plantings and hence the cost of new
plantings.  Also, it affects the producer surplus and the government revenue as
shown in Figure 3.
Farmers undertake new  plantings up  to the point where their expected
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost.  Thus,
(34)  E,  0(M)  = f  (NPo)
Then the total cost of new plantings in period 0 is
Ao  .
(35)  CNiP.  - f f(NP 0 ) dXP,- 21  -
PC,
Production  in  Period  0
Figure  3:  Effects  of  Export  Tax  on  WeLfare  in  Period  0- 22 -
Aasume  the  marginal  cost  curve  for  the  new  plantings  in  period  0  to
be linear,  i..,
(36)  MC  (NPo)  =  ao+a,NPo
Given  an  export  tax,  new  plantings  when  farmers,  price  expectations  are  naive  are
equal  to
(37)  NPo =  E  1 Yi(WP 0 -TX0 -PC)  -a(
a,
The cost of new plantings in  period 0 can be derived by inserting (39)  into (37)
(38)  CNPo =  [Ep'Y (WPo-TXo-PC)] 2-aO
In  Figure  3,
(39)  AD=-e 0 WP,-WPo  D
WPO
where  Do  a  demand facing the country in period 0 when there is no
tax
WPo  - world  price  without  tax
WPo 0 world price when tax is imposed- 23 -
s,,0  price elasticity of supply in period 0
(40)  A  =  -e.,,  °WP  °  Q°
where  QO  =  supply of the country without tax
AQO  - change in supply of the country due to tax
PP  =  producer price with tax
Also, by definition
(41)  PPO = (1-  TXRO) WPO
Because ADO  =  AQO  and Do  QO,  inserting (41)  into (40)  and equating it with (39),
we obtain
(42)  pI  =  _  po°  °  . TXR .WPO
eo-es, 0 . TXR0 *es, 0
The welfare change in period 0, AWO,  due to imposition of the export tax is
(43)  API = ArP 0(Q°  -,AQ)  -IAQ 0(WP-PPOI)
The  first term of the RHS of  (43)  is  the area  WPOABWPO and  the  second  term is- 24 -
the area BCE in Figure 3.  Because e*o  is small in the case of perennials, QO  is
considerably bigger than AQ%,  and hence (43) can be approximated by
(44)  AWO =  AWPO Q 0
Substituting (42)  into (44),  we obtain the formula  for the change in  welfare as,
45)  0  eO  W  es,QO  (1  - TXRo)
(ii)  The Effects of an Export Tax on Welfare Durina Periods when New
Plantings are Bearing
The  welfare effects of  the tax over  this  period (i  = ml  . ,m2)  can
be obtained from (12) assuming that the subsequently realized prices are the
government's expected prices.
(46)  AWmm  =  p  Yi*NPo[Es  O (WPj)  - SHj .Eg,  0 (WPiP)
Substituting (37)  for NPo  in (46)  gives the welfare change as a function of tax
(47)  AW,Y  . =£  ,'Yj[g 0 (WPd)  i  Egq,  (  WPj)  -_]  p  iY  (WPo  -WP.TXR  -PC)  -a.
I  ej  PC]  ~~~~~~~~~a.- 25 -
(iii)  Solving for the Optimal Tax
The expected total national welfare in  period 0 (  the year when new
plantings are being made) TWO,  can be expressed as
(48)  TWo =  -CNPO+AWO+AW 1 ,-me
Substituting (38), (45)  and (47)  into (48)  and taking the derivative of TXRo  and
setting it to zero gives,
(49)  Z2Wp 0(Epi  Y)  2  - Z2 WPo (_1  yi)  2 . TXRO
2  _O  QZ2Y2p 1 YjiI 1YlEg,o(WPi)  (1_  SH  =  0 +aleo.  es'O.  Qo-z£iipYEf(P  l  -e)=l
where  z  =  co - so  . TXRo  +  E,o
Hence, the optimal tax rate is
(50)~~~~  E-i  y  (1-  a,.  e  e9o  Q
(50)  ~~~TXRo3  =  l  e  Z2 Wp 0 (F2IY
°  ~~WPOE  P.,  Yi  z2  pi  yl)  2
Substituting  (23), i.e., the optimal tax rate without taking the short-term
effect into account, into (50),  gives- 26 -
2
(51)  z23'  4  a,  e  es,  o  0)
z2wP 0 (E2p'y 1) 2
(51)  is a cubic function of  TXRo 3 because Z is a function of tax.
The implicaticn  of (51)  is  that  when the short-term  price elasticity
of supply (e,g)  is non-zero, the optimal tax derived from taking only the long-
term supply response into account should be adjusted upward (the second term of
the RHS of t51) is positive) to take into account the effects of the tax on
welfare in period 0.  It is evident from (51)  that the larger QD,  the larger the
adjustment.
V.  Ouantification of the Optimal Tax
A  computer  model  was  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  above
specifications  to calculate optimal  tax and welfare for  perennial crop  exporting
countries.  The model was applied to several major cocoa producing countries to
estimate the optimal export tax. 5 However, only  the results  for Ghana  are
reported here.
The main inputs required for the model are;
(i)  Forecasts of world cocoa prices,
(ii)  Forecasts  of  cocoa  production  by  the  rest  of  the  world
consistent with (i),
(iii) Forecasts  of cocoa  production  of the  country concerned  without
any new plantings,
5  Details of the model applications to and assumptions used for several
major cocoa producing countries in Africa are given in Coleman, Varangis and
Akiyama (forthcoming).- 27 -
(iv)  Cocoa yield curve for the country,
(v)  Real discount rate,
(vi)  Area under cocoa in recent years,
(vii)  Recent data on new plantings and producer prices,
(viii)  Marketing costs,
(ix)  Average production costs,
(x)  Assumptions  about how the  farmers and  the government  form
price expectations.
The main outputs of the model are:
(i)  Sum  of  discounted  flow  of  producer  surplus,  government
revenues, the sum of the two which is the national welfare,
and export revenues,
(ii)  Optimal tax rates --  the optimal tax rate can be calculated
under  various  assumptions  about  the  way  farmers  and
governments form price expectations.  The tax rates can also
be made exogenous,
(iii) Forecasts of new plantings, area under cocoa, and production
for the country.
(iv)  Revised world prices --  the model calculates a new set of
world price forecasts  consistent with new plantings projected
by the model,
Projected world prices and production by the rest of the world were
obtained from  the World Bank's world cocoa model.  The welfare values have been
calculated for a 30-year period starting from 1991 and evaluated at 1991.
Government revenue is defined as the sum of the discounted flow of
tax revenues from the commodity over the next 30 years, i.e.,- 28  -
(52)  WG = E  PfQJWPiTXR 1
Farmers'  welfare is  defined as  the sum  of the  discounted flow  of producer surplus
less the new planting costs, i.e.,
(53)  Wt  - E P'I  3 1 (9WP 1 - TXR1 WP 1 - PC) - E  P  f  CNP 1
The national welfare is the sum of (52)  and (53).
Model simulations were carried out under various assumptions.  All
welfare values are in  constant 1991  terms.  These assumptions  and the results for
Ghana are given in Table 1.  In Table 1 "Tax =  Optimal" implies that the model
calculated the  optimal tax for  each year.  "Optimal - 10%"  implies that  the model
was run with an exogenously-fixed tax rate of the optimal rate plus 5% every
year.  Cases  IX and X  are with exogenously-fixed tax  rates of 0%  and 30%,
respectively.  "Net  Producer  Surplus" is  defined as "Producer  Surplus" less "Cost
of New Plantings".  For expectations," "Naive" implies that farmers expect the
current  real  producer  price  to  continue.  "WB  Project"  implies  that  the
government uses the World Bank's cocoa price projections as the base but also
takes into account the effects on world prices of future new plantings in the
country.  This implies that the government has perfect foresight about world
prices as it is assumed in the model calculations that the prices projected by
the World Bank adjusted for the effect of the country's production are actually
realized.  "Weighted" implies  that the government's price expectation is  that of
equation  (30)  where Xor=0.5,  1,0=0.3,  .2G-0.2  and  Aj=0  for  j=-3,...-n.Table  1:  Ghana: Simutation  Results  on Changes  in  the  Export  Tax on  Cocoa
Export  Tax Rate  Producer  Price  for  Cocoa
Year  I  Year  5  Year  10  Year  1  Year  5  Year  10
----------  X  -----------  (1991  US$/ton)
Government's  Expectation  - UB Proi.
I  (Tax  = Optimal  - 5X)  -12  3  10  977  993  986
11  (Tax  =  Optimal)  -7  8  15  919  926  918
III  (Tax  = OptimaL  - 5X)  -2  13  20  861  859  850
GoveruinentIs  Expectations  - Weighted
IV  (Tax  =  Optimal  - 10X)  2  6  6  817  950  1052
V  (Tax  = Optimal  - 53X)  7  11  11  759  883  983
VI  (Tax  = Optimal)  12  16  16  701  816  915
VII  (Tax  = Optimal  + 5X)  17  21  21  643  749  845  r
Vill  (Tax  = Optimal  +  10X)  22  26  26  585  681  775
IX  (Tax  =  Fixed  at 10X)  0  0  0  840  1029  1137
X  (Tax  = Fixed  at 30X)  30  30  30  492  627  722
Xi  (Tax  =  Optimal,  MC=$270/ton)  12  16  17  746  857  950
XII  (Tax  =  Optimal,  HC=$300/ton)  12  16  17  696  807  900
XIII  (Tax  = Optimal,  FDS=10X)  10  13  12  725  856  985
XIV  (Tax  = Optimal,  ER=10X  deval.)  13  17  18  719  825  910
XV  (Tax  =  Optimal.  W.B.  Proj.  11  16  15  707  793  807
lowered  by 10%  after  1995)
Basic  Assumptions: Farmers'  Price  Expectation  - Naive;  Govermnent's  Price  Expectation  - Weighted;  Marketing  Costs  (MC)  - $320/ton;  Harvesting  and
Maintenance  Costs  (HC)  - $350/ton;  Country's  Disccxnt  Rate  - 5X;  Farmers'  Discount  Rate  (FDS)=5%;  Exchange  rate  (ER)  - unchangedTable  1  (Continued)
|  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  . _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _.__  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  P  rod  u  ct  ion
Case  Producer  Cost of  New  Net Producer  Goverrnment  National  Year 10  Year 20
Surplus  Plantings  Surplus  Revenue  Welfare
---  (Sum  of  Discounted  Flows  over  30  years,  Million  1991  USS)  ---  ----- ('000  tons)  -----
I  3573  710  2863  543  3405  314  428
11  3088  542  2546  889  3435  306  398
III  2630  403  2227  1207  3433  299  369
IV  3709  728  2981  388  3369  300  428
V  3210  552  2658  748  3405  292  398
VI  2737  407  2330  1079  3409  285  369
VIl  2291  290  2002  1383  3385  278  341
Vill  1872  196  1676  1660  3336  270  314
IX  4237  956  3281  0  3281  305  462
x  1482  131  1351  1913  3264  261  291
Xi  2998  485  2513  1161  3673  290  386
Xii  2998  485  2512  1161  3673  290  386
Xiii  2675  117  2557  708  3265  265  287
XIV  3054  604  2451  1277  3728  296  408
XV  2310  301  2009  892  2901  284  344- 31 -
Basic assumptions  used in  the model are given at  the bottom of Table
1.  All the simulation shown in Table 1 are with the assumption that farmers'
expectation is "naive" and social discount rate is 5% in real terms.
The formula used in  the simulations for the  optimal tax rate is  that
given by equation  (23) for the cases in which the farmers' expectations are
"Naive" and the government'  s  "WB Proj."  The formula is equation  (31) for the
cases  in which  the  farmers' expectations  are  "Naive" and  the  government's
"Weighted".  The adjustment necessary to  take into account  the short-term supply
response, the second term of the RHS of equation (51)  for Ghana was found to be
2.5% under the assumption that the short-term price elasticity of supply, e,6 0
is 0.1.  This adjustment is incorporated in the model.
The simulation  results  given in  Table 1  indicate  that  the optimal  tax
rates vary significantly depending on the ways in  which farmers and governments
form price expectations.  For instance, the optimal tax rate for period 1 when
the farmers'  expectation are  naive and  the  government has  perfect foresight (Case
II)  the optimal tax rate is negative, implying subsidies.  The subsidies are
required  because the  government's best  action  --  given  world prices are  projected
to increase --  is  to raise  producer  prices substantially in  period 1  to encourage
new plantings so that the farmers and  the government can reap larger benefits in
the future when world prices are considerably higher than in period 1.
Probably the most striking revelation of the simulation results is
that national welfare changes little with changes in the export tax around the
optimal level.  As shown in Figure 4, when the farmers' and the government's
price expectations are "naive" and "weighted" respectively, the difference in
national welfare between an optimal tax case (Case  VI) and 10%  above the optimal
(Case  VIII), is only 2.1%.  However, producer welfare and government revenues- 32  -
Fig. 4: Ghana: Impact  of  Changes in
Export  Tax on Cocoa.
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Fig. 5: Ghana:  Effect  of  Changes  in
Cocoa  Export  Tax  on Long-Term  Production
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change sharply.  When the tax is increased by 10% throughout the period  (Case
VIII),  net producers' welfare  declines by 28%  and the  government's  revenue
increases by  54%.  Another observation ic  that the effect of changes in the
export  tax  on  production  over the  long-run  is  large.  The model  projects
production in year 2011 to be 15% and 28% lower if the tax is 10% and 20% higher
than the optimal tax respectively (see  Table 1 and Figure 5).
Case IX shows that if the export tax is set at zero throughout the
period, the national welfare is only 4% lower  than in the optimal tax case.  In
this case, production in the year 2011 is 25% higher at 462,000 tons.  Case X
shows that if the recent tax level of about 30% continues to be applied, the
national welfare  and the net producer surplus would be 4.3% and 4.5% lower,
respectively, than the case of the optimal tax.  Results here suggest that the
recent actual  tax rates on cocoa in  Ghana  have been too high and  production could
decline from the present level unless measures are taken on production cost,
marketing cost, interest rate or real exchange rate.
The impacts  on  welfare of changes in  marketing and  production costs,
the exchange rate, and the discount rate are estimated to be significant.  As
shown in Table 1, (Cases XI and XII) a reduction of $50/ton in marketing costs
from the  current level of  $320/ton or  in production costs  from the current
estimated $350/ton would increase national welfare by 7.7% (see  Figure 6).  It
is  to be noted that the analysis in this paper shows that the effect on welfare
of a change in marketing costs or production costs are the same.  In this case,
the optimal tax rates are higher because Ghana's market share increases.
Case  XIII, which assumes  the government's discount rate to be 5% and
the farmers' to be 10%, is  an interesting case.  In this case, the new planting
levels go down due to the high farmers' discount rate.  Because of the low new
plantings level, the total cost of new  plantings is small and the producers' net
welfare calculated using the social discount rate of 5% is higher than in the- 35 -
optimal case.  This implies that the farmers would be  living mainly on past
investments and  not  undertaking  new investments. This, has  an important  negative
impact on long-run production.  The optimal tax rates are lower because Ghana's
market share declines.
The  effects  of  a  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  are  also
significant. A 10% real  devaluation  would increase  the national  welfare in  terms
of constant US$  and constant Cedis by 9% and  19%, respectively  (Case XIV).
However, note that the optimal tax rates are slightly higher because of Ghana's
larger market share.
Case XV shows the important impact of world prices on welfare.  If
world cocoa prices after 1995 are 10% lower than what the Bank has projected,
then national welfare would be 15% lower and the optimal tax rate is slightly
lower because of Ghana's smaller share.
The findings  above  are  basically in  concordance  with  those  of  Newbery
(1990). The points Newbery  made include; (i)  producer prices should be at least
55% of f.o.b.,  (.i) the risks of setting producer price too low appear to be
higher than the risks in  the other direction, and (iii)  the-e appears to be good
reason to try and stabilize the real producer prices through adjustments of tax
rates.  Newbery's last  point can also be supported by the analysis in  this paper
because given long-term world cocoa prices, producers' incentives should not
fluctuate  with short-term  world  price fluctuations. However,  with such  a pricing
policy, there is a risk of misjudging long-term cocoa prices and give incorrect
incentives.- 36  -
Fig.6: Ghana: Welfare  Effects  of  Changes
in Marketing  and Production  Costs
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VI.  Concluding Remarks
The  paper  presents  analytical  solutions  to the  calculation  of optimal.
tax for  perennial crops and  their implications  for the  impact  on producer surplus
and government reserves.  It then provides the results of numerical simulations
under a variety of parameter assumptions, for the case of cocoa in Ghana.
The analysis demonstrated that the basic effect of the optimal tax
is tc adjust the producer price so  that the farmers' expected marginal revenue
fromn  new plantings becomes the expected marginal revenue of the country.  The
paper  shows  that  the  most  important  factors  to  be  taken  into  account  in
determining the export tax on perennials are how farmers  and the government form
price expectations.  The paper shows  that when farmers'  expactat0ons are unknown
or not dependent on recent prices cr taxes, the optimal tax is indeterminate.
Also,  if  the  government's  expected wczld  prices  are  far  from  subsequently
realized world prices, then in restrospect the optimal tax implemented would be
far from the optimal level.
Analysis on the effects of price expectations on the optimal tax
indicates  that  if  a  government  wants  to  impose  an  optimal  export  tax  on
perennials, it needs to have good knowledge of farmers' price expectations and
prospects for world prices.  Under the assumption that f&rmers' expectations on
prices and tax rates are based on recent levels, the paper showed that the
optimal tax depends on a number of factors, including, the way the government
forms  its  price  expectations,  the  discount  rate,  the  yield  curve  of  new
plantings, and the expected mark;et  share of the country.
6
6  A  factor  that  was  not  taken  into  account  in  the  paper  was  risk
preferences.  If farmers are risk-averse and the government risk-neutral, the
termn in the  bracket  on the  LHS  of equation  (16) becomes  E,O(WPi)  - TXi  - PC - RP.
Where RP is  the risk benefit defined in Ne-dbery  and Stiglitz (1981)  as, 0.5 RAa 2
where R is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion and, in  thie case, a is the
coefficient of variation of producer prices.  This implies that if farmers are
risk-averse and producer prices have been fluctuating, the optimal tax rates
should be lower than those derived in the paper.- 38 -
The application of the analysis using a computer model for Ghana's
cocoa  subsector revealed  that the  national welfare  does not  vary much over a  wide
range of export tax rates around the optimal level,  but that the export tax rate
does have  an important impact  on the  distribution of  the  national welfare between
the farmers and the government.  It also has a significant  effect on production
over  the long-run.  The  computer  model simulation  results showed  that the optimal
tax rates do not vary much with exchange rates, production costs and marketing
costs in the medium-run.
These results  imply  that  when determining  the level  of the export  tax
the government should give more importance to  the tax's effects on the long-term
production and the distribution of the national welfare than on maximizing the
national welfare, as long as the rate is not too far from the estimated optimal
level (note  that the government  can  only  pose "estimated  optimal tax"  because the
tax is  dependent on the government's expected prices).  A consideration in thim
context  iB  the  relative importance of the welfare weight  of each dollar  to
farmers and  the government. 7 The  question  of the  welfare  weight  becomes
important in deciding on the distribution of the nationl  welfare and hence the
tax rate.  For example, if it is considered that the farmers' consumption of a
unit of currency is more efficient in increasing the national welfare than the
government's, then the distribution should be in favor of the farmers, cetris
paribus.
The simulation results  also showed that for  Ghana's cocoa subsector
changes in the exchange rate, marketing costs, production costs, and discount
rate have a significant impact  not  only on the  national welfare  but also  on long-
run production.  Simulation results under several assumptions revealed that the
recent export  tax rate on cocoa in  Ghana of about 30% is  considerably higher  than
the optimal  tax  rate estimated  in the paper.  If the current  tax  rate  is
continued, production could decline from the recent level.
7  This question was also discussed in Trivedi and Akiyama (forthcoming).- 39 -
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